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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is a putative class action by African-American 
student-athletes challenging the minimum standar dized 
test score requirement for fr eshman year varsity 
intercollegiate athletic participation. This suit began almost 
four years ago and has previously been befor e us on 
appeal. See Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 
198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999). In the instant appeal, we must 
determine whether the District Court abused its discretion 
in denying plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend summary 
judgment and for contemporaneous leave to file a second 
amended complaint. We conclude that the District Court 
 
                                2 
  
did not abuse its discretion, and for the r easons that follow 
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is an 
unincorporated voluntary association of more that one 
thousand members, a majority of which are public and 
private four-year colleges and universities that conduct 
varsity intercollegiate athletic programs. The NCAA member 
colleges are divided into Divisions. This suit deals with an 
NCAA bylaw called Proposition 16, which af fects initial 
eligibility only in Division I.1 Proposition 16, codified at 
NCAA Bylaw 14.3, has two components which operate on a 
sliding scale: a minimum high school grade point average 
(GPA) in thirteen required cor e courses and a minimum 
standardized test score on the Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(SAT) or the ACT Assessment. 
 
Plaintiffs are African-American student-athletes who 
exceeded the NCAA minimum GPA requir ement for 
freshman year athletic participation but failed to achieve 
the minimum required score on the SA T as required by 
Proposition 16. They allege that, because of Pr oposition 16, 
they lost the opportunity to compete in Division I varsity 
intercollegiate athletics during their fr eshman year, were 
denied admission to Division I schools, were denied athletic 
scholarships, and/or were denied recruiting opportunities 
by Division I schools. 
 
Because the factual and procedural history of this case 
bears directly on our decision, we recite it in some detail. 
Plaintiffs began this action on January 8, 1997, alleging 
that the minimum standardized test scor e component of 
Proposition 16 violated Title VI r egulations because it had 
an unjustified disparate impact on African-American 
student-athletes. As plaintiffs' counsel stated in a 
declaration filed with the District Court, counsel chose to 
pursue a disparate impact challenge to Proposition 16, 
rather than an intentional discrimination claim, because a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Division I is comprised generally of the lar ger universities and 
colleges 
with the greater availability of athletic scholarship monies. 
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disparate impact claim had a less "demanding" standard of 
proof. On February 5, 1997, the NCAA moved to dismiss 
plaintiffs' complaint, contending, inter alia, that (1) there 
was no private right of action for unintentional 
discrimination under Title VI; (2) the NCAA was not a 
"program or activity" subject to T itle VI; and (3) the NCAA 
did not receive the federal funding necessary to subject it to 
Title VI. 
 
Plaintiffs responded to the NCAA's motion to dismiss and 
moved for partial summary judgment on the gr ounds that, 
as a matter of law, the NCAA was a covered pr ogram or 
activity subject to a Title VI action and was a recipient of 
federal financial assistance for purposes of T itle VI. The 
NCAA contends, and the District Court found, that as part 
of their opposition to the motion, plaintiffs demonstrated 
knowledge of several of the facts that plaintif fs would later 
allege were evidence of intentional discrimination. 
Specifically, plaintiffs referr ed to criticism from the 
administrator of the SAT and from the NCAA's own studies 
which warned that the NCAA's use of standar dized test 
scores for freshman eligibility would have a disparate 
impact on African-American student-athletes. Despite the 
existence of this evidence, however, plaintif fs did not 
suggest that it demonstrated intentional discrimination. To 
the contrary, the District Court found that plaintif fs praised 
the NCAA's motives in adopting initial eligibility standards 
as "laudable." 
 
On October 9, 1997, the District Court denied the NCAA's 
motion to dismiss while granting in part and denying in 
part plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The 
court determined that there was a private right of action 
under Title VI for disparate impact2  and held that the NCAA 
is a "program or activity" within the meaning of Title VI. 
However, the court left open the question of whether the 
NCAA receives federal funds as a result of its relationship 
with the National Youth Sports Program (NYSP). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Supreme Court has recently held that there is no private right of 
action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title 
VI. Alexander v. Sandoval, ___ U.S. ___ (2001). 
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On June 22, 1998, the United States Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Distr., 
524 U.S. 274 (1998). As a result, plaintif fs' counsel became 
aware that the Supreme Court had articulated a deliberate 
indifference standard, albeit in the Title IX context, to 
determine whether a recipient of federal funds could be 
liable for knowingly allowing discrimination to occur. 
Meanwhile, in response to the Supreme Court having 
granted certiorari in a Title VI case, the NCAA moved in 
September of 1998 to amend the District Court's October 9, 
1997, order and to certify for appeal the question of 
whether Title VI's implementing regulations permitted a 
private right of action. 
 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that they consider ed moving to 
amend their complaint to allege intentional discrimination 
at this point. However, because the District Court denied 
the NCAA's motion to certify the private right of action 
question for appeal, plaintiffs made a tactical decision not 
to move to amend their complaint. Plaintiffsfiled a motion 
for summary judgment on their disparate impact claim on 
October 6, 1998. That motion contained a footnote 
suggesting plaintiffs' belief that they could allege a 
purposeful discrimination claim in light of Gebser.3 
 
On November 13, 1998, plaintiffs moved to amend their 
complaint by adding two additional named parties. The 
NCAA filed a cross motion for summary judgment on 
November 18, 1998, and opposed plaintiffs' motions for 
summary judgment and for leave to add party plaintif fs. In 
support of its motion for summary judgment, the NCAA 
attached the affidavit of an NCAA official who opined that 
one of the valid educational objectives of Pr oposition 16 was 
closing the gap between black and white student-athlete 
graduation rates. 
 
By memorandum and order dated December 18, 1998, 
the District Court allowed the two additional named 
plaintiffs to intervene pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24. The 
District Court's order granting the motion specifically stated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. With the exception of that footnote, plaintiffs did not advance an 
intentional discrimination claim until after their disparate impact claim 
had been rejected on appeal. 
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that "it bears noting that the time is near to when motions 
of this sort would affect the close of discovery and 
consequently, any additional similar requests will be looked 
on with disfavor." 
 
Subsequently, both parties filed supplemental 
submissions in support of summary judgment and 
participated in oral argument. On March 8, 1999, the 
District Court denied the NCAA's motion for summary 
judgment and granted plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment, declaring Proposition 16 unlawful under Title 
VI's implementing regulations and permanently enjoining 
application of Proposition 16. See Cur eton v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D.Pa. 
1999). The District Court concluded that the NCAA was an 
indirect recipient of federal funding due to its complete 
control over the NYSP Fund. Alternatively, the District 
Court determined that the NCAA was subject to Title VI 
coverage because member schools had ceded contr olling 
authority to it. 
 
Next, the District Court determined that the NCAA's 
legitimate objective in adopting Proposition 16 was raising 
overall student-athlete graduation rates and r ejected the 
NCAA's alternative justification of closing the gap between 
black and white student-athlete graduation rates. The court 
held that the NCAA's second proffer ed objective, closing the 
gap between black and white student-athletes, was 
"unequivocally not the purpose behind" adoption of 
Proposition 16. Finally, the court deter mined that the use 
of the standardized test score for fr eshman eligibility had 
an unjustified disparate impact on African-American 
student-athletes and that there were equally effective 
alternatives to the standardized test score component 
which could further the NCAA's objective of incr easing 
graduation rates of student-athletes. On Mar ch 16, 1999, 
the District Court clarified its injunction and enjoined the 
NCAA from denying eligibility based on the minimum 
standardized test component of Proposition 16. 
 
On December 22, 1999, we reversed the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs and r emanded the 
case with directions to enter judgment for the NCAA. See 
Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999). Specifically, 
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we found that the Title VI regulations under which 
plaintiffs sued were program specific (i.e., specific to the 
NYSP) and therefore did not reach Pr oposition 16. In 
addition, we rejected the "controlling authority" argument 
and found that the NCAA was not a recipient of federal 
funds based on its relationship to its member institutions. 
 
On February 28, 2000, after the case was remanded to 
the District Court, plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or 
amend summary judgment and a motion for leave to amend 
their complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Pr ocedure 59(e) 
and 15(a). In their proposed amended complaint, plaintiffs 
allege that Proposition 16 has been adopted and used by 
the NCAA as an instrument of intentional discrimination 
against African-American student-athletes. On April 13, 
2000, the District Court denied the motion, finding it to be 
untimely, prejudicial to the NCAA, and futile. The District 
Court denied plaintiffs' request for r econsideration, and 
plaintiffs timely appealed. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court exercised federal question jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. We have jurisdiction over the 
District Court's final order denying plaintif fs' motion 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
We review a district court's refusal to allow a plaintiff to 
amend his complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) for 
abuse of discretion. Adams v. Gould Inc. , 739 F.2d 858, 863 
(3d Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1122 (1985). Similarly, 
when a district court rejects a motion to alter or amend a 
judgment filed pursuant to Rule 59(e), we r eview for abuse 
of discretion, except over matters of law, which are subject 
to plenary review. Id. at 863-64. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Both a motion to amend a judgment and a motion for 
leave to amend a complaint are addressed to the sound 
discretion of the district court. Where a timely motion to 
amend judgment is filed under Rule 59(e), the Rule 15 and 
59 inquiries turn on the same factors. Id. ; Newark Branch, 
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NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 907 F.2d 1408, 1417 n.14 (3d 
Cir. 1990). A district court may deny leave to amend a 
complaint if a plaintiff 's delay in seeking amendment is 
undue, motivated by bad faith, or prejudicial to the 
opposing party. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 
Moreover, the court may deny a r equest if the movant fails 
to provide a draft amended complaint, see Lake v. Arnold, 
232 F.3d 360, 374 (3d Cir. 2000), or may refuse to allow an 
amendment that fails to state a cause of action. Adams, 
739 F.2d at 864, citing Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 
706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 
The mere passage of time does not requir e that a motion 
to amend a complaint be denied on grounds of delay. 
Adams, 739 F.2d at 868. In fact, delay alone is an 
insufficient ground to deny leave to amend. Cornell & Co., 
Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n. , 573 
F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978). However , "at some point, the 
delay will become `undue,' placing an unwarranted burden 
on the court, or will become `prejudicial,' placing an unfair 
burden on the opposing party." Adams, 739 F.2d at 868. 
Delay may become undue when a movant has had pr evious 
opportunities to amend a complaint. See Lor enz v. CSX 
Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993) (three year lapse 
between filing of complaint and proposed amendment was 
"unreasonable" delay where plaintif f had "numerous 
opportunities" to amend); see also Rolo v. City Investing Co. 
Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 654-55 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting proposed second amended complaint where 
plaintiffs were repleading facts that could have been pled 
earlier). When a party delays making a motion to amend 
until after summary judgment has been granted to the 
adverse party, other courts have recognized that the 
interests in judicial economy and finality of litigation may 
become particularly compelling. See Diersen v. Chicago Car 
Exch., 110 F.3d 481, 489 (7th Cir . 1997); Humphreys v. 
Roche Biomed. Lab. Inc., 990 F.2d 1078, 1082 (8th Cir 
1993); Union Planters Nat'l Leasing Inc. v. W oods, 687 F.2d 
117, 121 (5th Cir. 1982); Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 
660 F.2d 594, 598 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981). Thus, while bearing 
in mind the liberal pleading philosophy of the federal rules, 
Adams, 739 F.2d at 864, the question of undue delay 
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requires that we focus on the movant's r easons for not 
amending sooner. Id. at 868. 
 
Moreover, substantial or undue pr ejudice to the non- 
moving party is a sufficient ground for denial of leave to 
amend. Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 1414. The issue of prejudice 
requires that we focus on the hardship to the defendants if 
the amendment were permitted. Adams , 739 F.2d at 868. 
Specifically, we have considered whether allowing an 
amendment would result in additional discovery, cost, and 
preparation to defend against new facts or new theories. 
Compare id. at 869 (finding no pr ejudice because no new 
facts or additional discovery were requir ed) with Rolo, 155 
F.3d at 655 (finding duration of case and substantial effort 
and expense in resolving underlying motion to dismiss 
could constitute undue delay or prejudice to defendants) 
and Cornell, 573 F.2d at 823-24 (finding significant 
prejudice because proposed amendment changed legal and 
factual basis of claim and prevented defendant from 
presenting defense). 
 
Turning to the case before us, the District Court, when it 
denied plaintiffs' post-judgment motion to amend, cited 
four reasons why plaintiffs' delay was undue: (1) the motion 
was filed three years after the complaint wasfiled; (2) the 
factual information on which the proposed amendment 
relied was known almost two-and-a-half years before 
plaintiffs sought leave to amend;4  (3) judicial efficiency 
would be damaged by trying claims seriatim; and (4) the 
interest in the finality of the proceedings would be 
compromised by amendment. Furthermor e, the District 
Court examined plaintiffs' asserted reasons for the delay in 
seeking amendment and determined that no "r easonable 
explanation" existed to overlook the delay. The court 
concluded that the only real reason advanced by plaintiffs 
for the substantial lapse in time was plaintif fs' misplaced 
confidence in their original disparate impact theory. 
 
The court next concluded that the NCAA would be 
prejudiced if plaintiffs were allowed to amend the complaint 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In fact, the District Court found that the plaintiffs demonstrated 
knowledge of many of the facts supporting their intentional 
discrimination claim as early as July 1997. 
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to add a claim of intentional discrimination. It determined 
that the new claim might require the court to revisit the 
certification of the class and that amendment would lead to 
further discovery requests and significant new preparation. 
The court concluded that "the proposed amendment would 
essentially force the NCAA to begin litigating this case again."5 
 
We cannot say that the District Court abused its 
considerable discretion in denying the post-judgment 
motion to amend. The court carefully analyzed plaintiffs' 
proffered reasons for delay, the prejudice to the NCAA, and 
the substance of the amended complaint. It concluded that 
the assertion of the claim was untimely and pr ejudicial to 
the NCAA. The District Court, which had considerable 
familiarity with the development of the factual and legal 
issues in this matter, concluded that the new claim 
fundamentally altered the proceeding and could have been 
asserted earlier. We find no err or in the District Court's 
conclusions. 
 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that our decision in Adams 
warrants reversal of the District Court. W e disagree. In fact, 
a careful reading of Adams supports the District Court's 
decision to deny leave to amend. 
 
In Adams, the plaintiffs brought an ERISA breach of 
fiduciary duty claim against the trustees of a pension plan. 
The defendants moved for summary judgment. In defending 
against this motion, plaintiffs advanced two legal theories. 
The District Court accepted plaintiffs' first theory and 
denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. The 
District Court did not address the alter native theory raised 
by plaintiffs. The District Court then certified a question for 
appeal based on the first theory. 739 F.2d at 862. We 
reversed the District Court's denial of summary judgment 
and directed that judgment be entered in favor of 
defendants. Id. at 863. We specifically declined to address 
the alternative legal theory which plaintif fs again sought to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court also concluded that allowing plaintiffs to amend 
would be futile. Because the District Court's judgment can be affirmed 
on grounds of delay and prejudice, we expr ess no opinion on the validity 
of the intentional discrimination claim alleged in plaintiffs' proposed 
amended complaint. 
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present. Id. at 863, 866 n.8. After r emand, plaintiffs 
"formally advanced the [alternative] theory," by moving to 
alter or amend the judgment, pursuant to Rule 59(e), and 
for leave of the District Court to file a second amended 
complaint, pursuant to Rule 15(a). Id. at 863. The District 
Court denied plaintiffs' motions. On the second appeal, we 
held that the District Court abused its discr etion in denying 
the motions to amend. 
 
Plaintiffs contend that the instant matter is 
indistinguishable from Adams. They focus on the District 
Court's denial of the NCAA's motion for summary 
judgment, our reversal with instructions to enter judgment 
for the NCAA, and the District Court's denial, on r emand, 
of plaintiffs' motion to amend. However , plaintiffs overlook 
significant factual and procedural dif ferences between 
Adams and the instant matter. 
 
Unlike the instant case, the alternative theory that the 
Adams plaintiffs ultimately pursued had been raised at 
earlier points in the litigation. "This contention was 
asserted earlier in the litigation in plaintif fs' briefs, but was 
not addressed either by the district court or by this court 
. . . ." Id. at 861. In Adams,"[w]e specifically limited our 
holding to the certified question, and declined to reach the 
issue now before us, although the plaintif fs tried to raise it 
at oral argument." Id. at 863. 
 
Thus, in contrast to the plaintiffs her e, the Adams 
plaintiffs proffered the alter native theory to both the district 
and appellate courts prior to moving to amend. Mor e 
importantly, unlike the instant case, the Adams  plaintiffs 
had not cross-moved for summary judgment and thus had 
not themselves sought a merits determination on their 
claims. In contrast, although the plaintiffs here by their 
own admission had sufficient facts and legal authority to 
allege an intentional discrimination claim at least by 
September of 1998, rather than attempting to add that 
claim, they filed for judgment on the merits on their 
disparate impact claim. A month later, they moved to add 
party plaintiffs, and the district court gave them the 
opportunity to do so.6 The District Court heard oral 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. While plaintiffs styled their motion a"Motion to Amend to Add Party- 
Plaintiffs and/or Alternative Motion to Intervene," the District Court 
determined that the additional parties would be recognized as 
intervenors pursuant to Rule 24. 
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argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment and, 
after considering voluminous exhibits and the undisputed 
facts, resolved the legal issues and reached the merits of 
the disparate impact claim. See Cureton , 37 F. Supp. 2d 
687. We reversed the District Court's or der on appeal. In 
light of the fact that plaintiffs participated in 
comprehensive proceedings which resulted in summary 
judgment for the NCAA, "the concerns offinality in 
litigation become more compelling [because] the litigant has 
had the benefit of a day in court, in some fashion, on the 
merits of his claim." Dussouy, 660 F .2d at 598 n.2. 
 
Moreover, the Adams defendants demonstrated no 
prejudice from the amendment. Here, the prejudice to the 
NCAA is significant. During the lengthy and compr ehensive 
proceedings below, the NCAA had defended against a 
disparate impact challenge to Proposition 16 and had no 
notice that the question of discriminatory intent was at 
issue. This is not a case where the question of 
discriminatory intent permeates the plaintif fs' original 
claim. See Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 519 
(3d Cir. 1988) (finding little prejudice where defendant had 
notice of amended claim because additional issue 
permeated original claim); see also Adams , 739 F.2d at 869 
(finding no prejudice where plaintif fs proffered alternative 
theory before both district and appellate courts before 
moving to amend). On the contrary, to the extent that the 
NCAA's intent had been addressed in this case, it had been 
characterized by plaintiffs as "laudable" and by the District 
Court as "legitimate." Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 701-05. 
Thus, if amendment were permitted, the NCAA would be 
prejudiced by having to engage in burdensome new 
discovery and significant new trial preparation. 
 
In Adams, we recognized that these matters are 
committed to the District Court's sound discr etion. 739 
F.2d at 868. The refusal to grant leave without any 
justification for the denial can be an abuse of discretion. 
See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; Lake, 232 F .3d at 373. 
However, "[i]t is certainly not inconceivable to us that 
instances could occur in which the failure to make a timely 
motion to amend a complaint would place an unwarranted 
burden upon a trial court, or be prejudicial to the party 
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opposing the motion." Coventry, 856 F .2d at 520. In such 
circumstances, the obligation of the district court in its 
disposition of the motion is to articulate the pr ejudice 
caused by the delay and to balance those concer ns against 
the reasons for delay. Id. The District Court satisfied its 
obligation here. We find no reason to disturb its judgment. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' 
motion to alter or amend summary judgment and for 
contemporaneous leave to file a second amended complaint. 
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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